The Upside of U.S.-Chinese Strategic Competition: Institutional Balancing and Order Transition in the Asia Pacific

The political scientists He and Feng offer a counterintuitive and refreshingly optimistic argument about competition between China and the United States. They insist that the two rivals are not destined for military conflict, thanks to the abiding strength of nuclear deterrence and the constraints of economic interdependence, and because the competition between them occurs primarily through institutions. This competition engenders three unintended positive consequences: more dynamic regional institutions, occasional collaboration between the two superpowers, and greater provision of public goods such as infrastructure and development funding. China created the new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2016, for example, at least partly in response to the slow pace of International Monetary Fund reform, which in turn helped trigger reforms in the U.S.- and Japanese--dominated Asian Development Bank. U.S.-Chinese competition has also spurred constructive reform in other multilateral organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations. The authors acknowledge that the rivalry will invariably produce periods of serious friction. But they argue convincingly that institutions, deterrence, and interdependence can mitigate conflict and that the new great-power competition will also yield underappreciated dividends.