Total War Is Back—and America Must Adapt

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

In the last few years, the world has seen the outbreak of a kind of war that had long seemed like a thing of the past. There was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; a Gaza war that threatened to turn into a full Middle Eastern war, and in many ways did; growing dangers in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea; and tremendously damaging fighting in places like Sudan that get much less global attention.

Mara Karlin, a scholar of war, as well as a veteran policymaker, served as the top U.S. Defense Department official overseeing strategy as these conflicts started or escalated. She argues in an essay in Foreign Affairs that we are seeing a return of total war—of conflicts that are more comprehensive and complex than ever before. Karlin joins me to discuss how fighting in Ukraine and the Middle East is reshaping our understanding of modern war and what this means for U.S. military strategy, especially in the face of growing tensions with China.

Mara, thank you so much for joining me.

MARA KARLIN

Thanks for having me. It’s such a treat to be here.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Well, there’s a huge amount to mine in your recent essay for Foreign Affairs. It’s called, “The Return of Total War,” and it manages to be both a sharply argued piece and to shed light on so much of what preoccupies us in the national security and foreign policy debate today, whether that’s Ukraine or the Middle East or China or more. And you, of course, bring to that your recent experience as the senior U.S. Defense Department official overseeing strategy and plans. And I note that you’ve also written a number of other pieces in Foreign Affairs over the last decade or so that remain strikingly relevant, so that’s all to say we’ve got a lot to get to.

But I want to start with the disquieting geopolitical moment that we’re in, which is really what prompted your recent piece. You note in that essay that for most of the post–Cold War era, American policymakers and military thinkers saw major war between states as, if not unthinkable, at least a distant prospect or an unlikely prospect, something that might come, as you put it, “only in the far-off future, if ever.”

You’ve through that period, of course, worked in the Pentagon across several administrations, as well as studied warfare as a scholar outside of government. Some of this is a matter of misperceiving geopolitical realities or security dynamics, and some of it is really about changes in those dynamics. So I’m curious as you reflect back on these last decades and how we got here, what in your view we were missing as we understood the geopolitical reality we were in, and what changed that really subverted the expectations we had?

MARA KARLIN

Absolutely, and Dan, I really like your use of the word disquieting because I think it perfectly captures this moment we’re in when we look across the security environment, and we’re just seeing bumps and hills and mountains all over the place. And what’s particularly challenging is how different they look.

So look, I think part of how we got here was a very understandable desire to try to narrow our focus. And I say that’s understandable because when you’re trying to define defense strategy and figure out which sort of wars to plan for, you invariably have finite time, attention, and resources. You’re also invariably going to be somewhat sucked in by whatever’s occurring at this moment in time.

And so it makes a lot of sense that in the Cold War period of time, there’s this massive obsession with the Soviet Union, even though in practice the United States ends up losing 58,000 troops in an insurgency in Vietnam. And then in the post–9/11 wars in particular, it also makes sense that there’s this obsessive focus on how to fight terrorists, insurgents, and violent non-state actors and to think about great power challenges as this far off thing that we might have to deal with maybe possibly perhaps some time, but it’s just not going to get the priority.

So I say this all with a little bit of empathy for the folks who’ve had to try to figure out how to do it but also with the recognition that it has brought us to a somewhat problematic place.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The surprise that you note is not just the return of major war, but also a change in the nature of warfare—the kind of warfare we’re dealing with. You note in the beginning of the piece that, “When war changes, the new shape it takes almost always comes as a surprise.” You were sitting in the Pentagon when the war in Ukraine started, the first major war in Europe in decades. You were there when the war in the Middle East started, and I think also when the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan became really a top of mind possibility for American policymakers and military thinkers. What, as you observed those, surprised you and your colleagues, both in government and outside of government, as you started to see these wars and grappled with what they meant?

MARA KARLIN

So what’s interesting to me on Ukraine in particular is how the things that we didn’t get right largely fell in our favor, and so there’s an element of luck there. So, examples of things we didn’t get right. Folks assumed that Ukraine would fall really fast to Russia. Turns out that didn’t happen, and we’re sitting here in December 2024, Ukraine still exists as a country. No way did folks assume that in February 2022.

Another thing that we didn’t get right: there were these expectations that the really robust Russian military modernization for about a decade or so previously would result in this tremendously effective military. Turns out that didn’t happen. Now, to be sure, Russia’s obviously adapted and innovated, et cetera, but it’s taken a long time to do that. So that was a near-term thing that didn’t go the way we expected.

Third thing is, frankly, the whole of government came together quite smoothly and so did the U.S. network of allies and partners. Now looking back, the fact that we had so much intelligence about what Russia was going to do should have made this a little bit easier, and yet it didn’t necessarily do so, right? It’s obviously become public that a number of allies and partners didn’t believe the intelligence that Russia was going to be conducting this invasion. But ultimately, this is another great area where you see the assumption is. . . how are you really going to knit folks together across the U.S. government, across allies and partners? And it ends up working spectacularly well, and you get, for a couple years, 50 plus countries giving military assistance to Ukraine.

So I note these three case studies within Ukraine in which, look, folks are going to call things wrong inevitably in trying to understand changes in warfare, but these happen to fall in a way that were more useful than less useful.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The framing analysis of the piece is about this notion of total war, comprehensive conflict—the idea that we were in an age of much narrower wars that drew on less of our power, had fewer kinds of conflict, to something that is much more comprehensive and engulfing. Could you define this new kind of total war? Say a bit about how it is the same as what we saw in previous decades during the twentieth century and in what ways do you see it as different and new?

MARA KARLIN

So it seems to me we want to widen our aperture in how we think about conflict and the laboratories where we’re seeing conflicts today, in particular across Europe and the Middle East and then some rumblings in the Indo-Pacific, demonstrate a couple key areas here.

So one way in which I think we need a wider aperture is thinking about the continuum of conflict. As I noted earlier, it was a little bit easier and a little bit satisfying to say, we’re only going to have to really worry about one type of war. So we’re only going to have to worry about fighting terrorists and insurgents, or we’re only going to have to worry about fighting high-end conventional wars, or even nuclear wars. And I think what we have seen in recent years is actually, nope, those have all bled into each other, and that continuum has almost fallen apart on itself, which is a lot more complicated, no doubt.

Another thing I think we’ve seen in the changing character of war is the demographics. So, who’s relevant on a battlefield and off a battlefield? What I mean by that is, on a battlefield, the composition of the militaries looks a little bit different than we’ve seen traditionally, whether it’s the persistent Russian efforts to bring in convicts, for example. Now, of course, we see North Korean troops that have gone to help the Russians, as an example. And also you’ve seen this international legion, if you will, of volunteers who've tried to help Ukraine.

Moreover, when we look off the battlefield, a number of actors have tried to shape what’s happening. Again, looking at just Ukraine as a case study here. So I mentioned you’ve got 50 plus countries giving military aid to Ukraine, for example. In the case of Russia, of course, you’ve got Chinese assistance, Iranian assistance, North Korean assistance. So whereas one might’ve wanted to take a little bit of a soda straw approach and say, “I’m just worried about this bad actor or this bad actor,” you actually need a wider aperture.

And then the final piece that I would really highlight is how we think about deterrence and the echoes of that and their evolution over the last few years. As you know so well, so much of the thinking on deterrence comes out of thinking about nuclear issues, such as back in the 1950s. And there’s been a need to progress it and fast-forward it, but for a whole bunch of reasons, not much has happened on that front. Not least because when you’re worried about terrorist groups such as al Qaeda or ISIS, deterrence just isn’t terribly relevant.

And so what we’ve had to do is think about, okay, how do you meaningfully try to deter, say, Iran and Hezbollah, from dramatically escalating a conflict in which they may have certain interests, but their involvement could make it much more spectacular? So thinking, I think, in those key areas—the continuum of conflict being shattered, the demography of war and who’s relevant, who we need to worry about, and then how deterrence is shifting and how different actors play a role within that—seem to be playing in to elements of this broader approach to total war.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

You have fascinating material in the piece looking at both the war in the Middle East and in Ukraine on how all these different kinds of warfare coexist in ways that are surprising. And whether that’s sophisticated air defense systems along with guys on motorcycles, or hang gliders in the Middle East, or the nuclear specter in Ukraine along with trench warfare that looks like it could be in World War I. All of these coexist in ways that they haven’t before, that we haven’t quite processed before. Is that the right way of putting it?

MARA KARLIN

I think that’s exactly the right way. And so it really shows that we’ve got to be much more comfortable recognizing that these issues will bleed into one another, and in particular, then, the way you try to counter this type of war is going to look a little bit different. Not only do you need to use all the parts of your interagency, but you’ve also got to have a really rich understanding of who your adversary is, what’s compelling them, and being able to figure out when you need to turn up the pressure or enable a de-escalation.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So let me pick up on both the deterrence point and some of your initial comments about the outbreak of war in Ukraine. You note in the piece that, “today, almost every debate about U.S. foreign policy and national security boils down to the challenge of deterrence.”

One of the big deterrence challenges that has been faced in the last few years is, of course, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And what was so fascinating watching this from outside government, it seemed like this case where everyone saw what was coming. As you noted, there was a huge effort on the part of the U.S. government to, in many cases, declassify intelligence to make the case to allies and publics that this was coming and Russia was in fact responsible for the invasion. And in some ways that led to a more successful response than I think anyone would’ve guessed, as you said, in February 2022. But it also was a deterrence failure in some sense. You were not able to persuade the Russians not to invade. As you look back at that effort to deter at that point, what accounts for that failure and what do you think the lessons of that are going forward?

MARA KARLIN

Look, I don’t think Putin was going to be compelled to change his course of action on Ukraine short of some massive effort by the United States to put troops on the ground. And I think it would’ve been a very difficult thing to make the case that we should start sending U.S. troops to Ukraine to try to deal with a potential Russian invasion.

Having lived through the 2014 Crimea invasion. . . part of the reason that the Russians got away with Crimea in 2014 is they were so stealthy about it, right? I mean, so many of us sitting in the Pentagon during that period of time, and so many of our allies, just spent months trying to understand who was doing what, were they trying to achieve? I mean, there was just all this tremendous and beautifully orchestrated disinformation by the Russians, and that really, I think, flummoxed the U.S. government, and it flummoxed a whole bunch of folks across Europe as well.

And so that’s part of the reason why, when it started to become clear these Russian plans to do this massive conventional invasion of Ukraine, part of me just wondered, gosh, why would they make it so obvious? Why would they try to do that? And I do believe it was not least due to a tremendous confidence that Putin had that his military could achieve this and an assumption that the international community would just let it happen.

And look, if you look at some other case studies, I can somewhat understand why he might have been so delusional. So for example, Hong Kong, right? Hong Kong has been effectively eaten by Beijing, and the international community hasn’t done a whole lot about that. I do wonder the extent to which that might be an analogy for Putin where he’s thinking, look, there’ll be some huffing and puffing, but maybe things can work out a certain way.

So all this is perhaps a long way of saying, I think the requirement needed to preclude Putin from conducting the invasion was going to be tremendously high and robust. And so given that it was going to occur, it was really important to obviously try to convince him otherwise, and folks did that at very senior levels—unfortunately that was unsuccessful. Then, make it very clear who is the bad guy here. So push out all of the intelligence to show, no kidding, this was the Russians, this wasn’t some curious group. And then finally try to mobilize folks across our government and across a bunch of others to actually present a robust response.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

What about Afghanistan? And I don’t mean this in the glib, politicized sense of the talking point that it was all about the chaotic withdrawal during the Biden administration. But you can understand why Putin might look at, really across multiple administrations and across parties, a pretty clear desire by the United States to be less involved in foreign wars, an exasperation with these failed efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the years, and would conclude from that that it was unlikely that the United States would really step up in a serious way. Obviously, this is in some sense unknowable, and it’ll be argued about by historians and political scientists for decades. But how should we think through that question? How do you think about that dimension of it?

MARA KARLIN

I mean, it seems to me you could read it a couple different ways. There are definitely the folks who say, “Hey, the president’s decision to pull out of Afghanistan and the rather complex withdrawal in August 2021 encouraged Putin to thus do the invasion of Ukraine.” It would seem to me though, while I understand some folks may read it that way, I actually would read it differently, which is, President Biden came in and effectively said, “Hey, after 20 years, what more are we actually going to achieve?” And I found that to be a pretty gutsy move given just how many other folks had looked at this exact topic and had, assessment after assessment, said, “Just a little bit more. We’re turning a corner. We’re nearly there.” And so there is something, I think, to be said for saying, “If not in two decades, then how much more will it really take?”

What I’ve wondered a bit is the extent to which NATO, obviously not just the United States, but NATO pulling out of Afghanistan in August 2021, did encourage Putin. And I say that because he had to think that now NATO would need to focus elsewhere. And fundamentally, the sine qua non of NATO is to focus on European security. And so I wondered if part of the reason he didn’t want to try to conduct this invasion soon after and as quickly as possible was because he knew that NATO would have to start recalibrating. And as it did, it would ultimately look around and say, “Gosh, European security is not looking exactly the way that we would want.”

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So I want to dig into your comments earlier on Ukraine and the ways in which we were, I think, all surprised by the success of the Ukrainians, with support from the United States and NATO and others, in fending off that initial Russian invasion and taking back territory over those early months and even now. It’s become a much more difficult fight for the Ukrainians but still doing much better than I think most of us would’ve guessed in February 2022. As you’ve watched that war play out, what did that early pessimism miss? What has allowed Ukraine to outperform expectations on the battlefield?

MARA KARLIN

I think we’re generally pretty terrible at understanding will to fight and also can’t help but use analogies, often totally inappropriately. One of my favorite books is Thinking in Time by [Richard] Neustadt and [Ernest R.] May, which I’m sure you know well, and it’s all about how we can use analogies responsibly. Post-August 2021, I think there were folks looking around and saying, “Gosh, the Afghans didn’t fight, so Ukraine won’t fight.” Obviously those analogies make no sense for about 150 different reasons, but it totally makes sense why human nature is going to connect these two events close in time, and so I think that was the assumption.

I also think starting, gosh, I think it was probably 2014, 2015 or so, there was this robust effort to train Ukraine’s military to work on anticorruption and reform efforts, and those actually were bearing fruit. And I think that’s a good chunk of the reason why we saw Ukraine’s military perform much better than we could have assumed.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The other issue that has been quite central to the debate about Ukraine is escalation and fears of escalation, both nuclear and conventional, horizontal and vertical. This has been, I think, a central concern for American policymakers. It’s been a big part of the public debate. You note in the recent essay in Foreign Affairs that, and I’m quoting you here, “Washington has spent inordinate time debating where, when, and under what circumstances Ukraine should use military assistance” in order to avoid tripping Russia’s red lines.

As you’ve been involved in those decisions and watched that experience from outside government, what has that taught us about escalation, and how do you address the critique from people outside of government, including people in the Ukrainian military and government, that Washington has been too concerned about escalation, too sensitive to Russian threats and bluster in a way that has had a damaging effect on the Ukrainian war effort?

MARA KARLIN

It has been a little bit surprising since leaving government how escalation management doesn’t appear to have deeply resonated with a lot of folks who have not been directly involved in these issues over the last few years.

So put incredibly bluntly, we have been the closest to nuclear use over the last three years than in either of our lifetimes—like many, many decades. That should be a little bit striking and a little bit shocking. And the fact that we have not seen nuclear use, I do think that that has been due to a very delicate and complex set of engagements with senior Americans and senior Russian officials over the last few years. So it is important to recognize we are in this reality where nuclear weapons haven’t been used. That’s a good reality. Neither of us wants nuclear weapons to be used, but it didn’t just happen.

Now, there are some folks who will say, “Hey, pish-posh. Putin was never going to use nuclear weapons.” I’m not really sure. There’s definitely evidence. He’s made threats. He’s taken steps, such as changing his doctrine. I think it would’ve been downright irresponsible to ignore the things he has said and the things that he has done.

Now, how do you move beyond that issue of escalation management to also simultaneously and robustly support Ukraine’s military? And it’s a really, really tough one. Figuring out, what is it, first of all, that Ukraine’s military needs just to be effective on a battlefield that has been shape-shifting? And then from that, what are those things that are going to be perturbing to the Russians and what are those things that will be exceedingly problematic to the Russians? And we saw a number of examples, particularly throughout 2022 and part of 2023, where I think folks were twisting and turning. What do you do about tanks, for example? What do you do about MiGs? What do you do about F-16s? And what impact would those have on tripping Russian red lines? And it turns out they didn’t.

Obviously the issue of late has been about ATACMS [U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System missiles], and Ukraine now both has them and appears to be able to use them deeper into Russia, and there hasn’t been an effect. That seems to be working well. There’s also probably a temporal piece here where it’s possible the Russians might have been more apoplectic had this been the case six months ago.

Part of this is, we’re operating in this really gray zone, and I would say it’s also probably magnified by the fact that a lot of folks, myself included, believe there’s no unicorn weapon. There’s no just, “give them the thing,” and it will have the effect. And unfortunately, so much of this conversation inevitably gets colored by just “give them the thing.”

So all this is a way of saying, I think there’s been some real successes in not tripping Moscow’s red lines and not having nuclear use. However, there’s probably been a whole lot more debate and even occasionally paralysis as folks have tried to figure out what exactly the right answer is.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Just to focus on that temporal point, which is really interesting to me, the argument here is that to the Ukrainians or to outside observers it might look like we’re just delaying a decision, but to your mind, that may be really important. That delay allows for signaling and gradual escalation of our assistance in a way that allows us to contain the effects of that on the Russian side. Is that the right way of understanding that?

MARA KARLIN

I think that’s exactly right. So if we could just hone in for a moment on the first few weeks of the war, and what we saw in those first few weeks, as I noted earlier, was shattered expectations. Ukraine’s military, turns out, knows how to fight really well. Russia’s military, turns out, was not fighting terribly well. And a whole bunch of folks across the international community wanted to do something to be helpful to Ukraine. So in a moment like that amid all the uncertainty, it’s really important that you’ve got clear signaling vis-à-vis Moscow. When you’re in more of a situation of say, almost a trench warfare, field lines that aren’t changing so much, then I probably would worry a little bit less about that.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So I have to ask you, because we’re, I don’t know, a month or so out from the Trump administration taking over this policy, and we’ve seen statements from Trump himself about his desire to end the war in 24 hours. There are several key players in the administration, including his vice president, JD Vance, who have endorsed a vision for ending the war that is not that far from what you would hear from Vladimir Putin.

As you look at Ukraine over the next year or so, what worries you as you imagine what a Trump policy might be, and stepping beyond the speculation about what Trump might do, because none of us really knows, what’s a plausible, non-catastrophic scenario from a Ukrainian point of view of how this might end—of where the war might go and how a war effort that has gotten much harder in the last few months might manage to be sustained or lead to some end game that would be an acceptable outcome from a Ukrainian perspective?

MARA KARLIN

Absolutely. So look, I think we all want this war to end. And as we know, to state the obvious, it could end tomorrow if Putin decided that he didn’t want to keep up eating Ukraine. That’s probably not going to happen. So then what does the way forward look like? I wouldn’t try to presume to speak for the Ukrainians. I think the real question is what sort of security guarantees exist and who makes those guarantees that would make Ukraine feel as comfortable as possible with lines that may not exactly be where they want them to be?

So last I checked, I think Russia was occupying say 18 or so percent of Ukrainian territory. That’s actually a pretty decent chunk when you think about it, nearly a fifth or so of a country. I think it would be hard to imagine a country deciding to just let that go. So even if Putin says, “Hey, let’s draw the lines right here. Don’t worry, we swear we won’t do anything else,” it’s hard to imagine that anyone could credibly believe that. So what does it look like for other countries, particularly countries like the United States and NATO members, to be able to say to Ukraine, “Look, we will help you rebuild and regroup and know that there’s some way to keep things as quiet as possible until you’re ready to re-approach this.”

Look, this will be, I think, probably the definitive year for this war. I mean, all wars shape-shift, and so 2022 is the year that we see spectacular change with the invasion and Ukrainians pushing them back, all of this optimism. Then 2023, particularly about halfway through, is when we start to say, “Hey, wait a second. This massive counteroffensive doesn’t seem to be having its effect. Battlefield lines aren’t really changing so much.” And 2024, of course, you see moments of the Ukrainians getting into Russia, but we’re not seeing huge change the way we did two years ago.

And so now, if you have an incoming U.S. administration—which frankly, the United States has been the convener of the international community, has given half of the international aid to Ukraine’s military. . . If you have a United States that now says, “Hey, we’re not really going to be a part of this anymore and we’re not going to be a leader in particular,” it’s hard to imagine that folks can think of an endgame that’s terribly satisfying, let alone for Ukraine.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

And is there anything that would lead to a major breakthrough either for the Russians or for the Ukrainians in the next year, or do you think that we’re stuck in something like the status quo? Anything can happen, but absent some complete change in U.S. policy, is there any real shift in momentum that you can imagine?

MARA KARLIN

Yeah, I guess there’s three things that jump out. One, Ukraine runs out of stuff, which is quite feasible if the United States is no longer going to be giving assistance nor urging others to do so. So that just makes waging a war a whole lot easier. Two, Russia could maybe finally make good on its promise to use nuclear weapons, and then obviously we’re in a totally different ballgame. And then at a slightly different level, three, we could see the Ukrainians strike really deep into Russia—do some spectacular attack in Moscow or somewhere that really just throws the Russians off. So we know at least one of those is going to happen. The U.S. effort is going to be transformed with the incoming Trump administration.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So let me move us to the other active major conflict in which the United States has a major role, and that’s obviously the one in the Middle East. We’ve talked a lot in the Ukraine context about the challenge of shaping the action of an ally. In this case, it’s of course Israel and Gaza and in the region more generally. But you do sense even from people in the U.S. government and the military a real frustration with the limitations of the U.S. ability to shape Israeli action or, in some cases, the failure of the U.S. government to use leverage in more dramatic ways. And part of that has been a frustration with the lack of a clear theory of victory on Israel’s part in Gaza, especially.

As you’ve observed that, in those early months of the war when you were in the Pentagon and then from the outside since, what has that taught us about our ability to shape an ally’s action in an effort where we’re supporting them? This has been an acute issue in both Gaza and in Ukraine.

MARA KARLIN

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, what we do have in Gaza is probably the most complex battlefield in the history of war. And your point is spot on in terms of lack of theory of victory. Frankly, I’ve yet to see anyone come up with a half-decent one that can work for all relevant parties rather than just kick the can down the road yet again, as is so often the case on the Middle East.

My view on shaping allies and partners is that it’s better for you to have them on your team and try to influence them than to not have them on your team and have them turn elsewhere. I do think there have been some periods where the Israelis have been shaped in ways that make sense. So you’ve seen this sometimes in particular on the humanitarian aid piece where they have been willing to make pushes. Unfortunately you also see the exact opposite on that piece as well, where they have been unwilling to make pushes as well. So it’s been, I think, just terribly thorny.

To the extent that you can get others involved, it’s going to be more effective. The Gulf countries—Jordan, Egypt—I think are really good case studies here as well to the extent that they can play a productive role in trying to shape Gaza day after and trying to help the Israelis feel some sort of security and thus a willingness to be more productive in the future of Gaza is probably the best we can do here.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The Israeli campaign that has probably outperformed expectations, at least as most outside observers held them, is the battle against Hezbollah over the last few months. As we have this conversation, we’re in the very early days of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah that at least appears to be holding.

You wrote about the. . . I believe you called this the “coming war” between Israel and Hezbollah in Foreign Affairs a few years ago. And you noted at the time that most observers were quite impressed with Hezbollah’s capabilities, in the sense that they had been quite effective in Syria especially, and there was of course a constant flow of relatively advanced missiles from Iran to Hezbollah over the years.

Did we overrate Hezbollah? Did we get something wrong about their capabilities? Are we overstating how damaged it is now, or was there something about the Israeli campaign that allowed it to be particularly effective?

MARA KARLIN

So I’m hard-pressed to think of another group like Hezbollah that has taken as many hits in as short of a time—like, across history. It’s pretty astonishing when you think about the entire senior leadership being eliminated by the Israelis, by the wide number of operatives that have faced casualties, and the Israeli efforts to really dismantle a bunch, though definitely not all, of Hezbollah’s infrastructure.

That said, the fundamental challenges within Lebanon don’t change. The Shiite community in Lebanon still being underrepresented; Iran still trying to exploit the tensions there; a profoundly weak Lebanese government whose currency unfortunately has been in the gutter now for years, whose political leadership is largely feckless and impotent at best. That’s all still there and not changing.

So we are in the throes of this ceasefire for the moment. I worked the 2006 war from the Pentagon and worked on the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which helped to end that war. And the theory at that moment in time was: you’d end this war and you’d get the Lebanese military to deploy across Southern Lebanon, which was a big deal. They had never been there before. They were going to be able to fill the space.

In practice, while it was good for them to be there and to start getting trained and equipped, they ultimately didn’t do that much, right? We’ve got the UN Force, of course, UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon]. The best part of its name is “interim” because it’s been there since 1978. So now we’re in a little bit of a different moment.

I think both Israel and Hezbollah had an incentive for this ceasefire. Hezbollah sure needs a breather. The Israelis have achieved probably anything they’re going to achieve at this moment. What I’m really curious about going forward is this new ceasefire effort. It sounds like it’s supposed to be in particular monitored by the United States, and I really wonder how the United States is going to do that, and in particular, what it will do with violations because, frankly, violations are inevitable, right?

And this is a pause—and that’s not a bad thing. A pause is meaningful, particularly for the people of Southern Lebanon and Northern Israel, but fundamentally it will just be a pause. And now how does the United States very delicately make sure there’s some sort of meaningful punishment when folks inevitably don’t follow what they promised?

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The less successful campaign by Israel and its backers is that against the Houthis, who have, I think, continued to put a serious threat against shipping in the Red Sea, as they have for several months. You note in the recent essay that the emergence of these kinds of sea-based threats is going to be a bigger factor than we thought a few years ago. And as you note, the inability of the U.S. Navy “to ensure the security of the Red Sea has called into question whether it would be able to fulfill that mission in an increasingly turbulent Indo-Pacific.” We’ll get to the Indo-Pacific in a bit, but when you look at the campaign against the Houthis, why has this proved so much harder than we thought, and what do you take from that difficulty?

MARA KARLIN

This has been really the dark horse of this year plus in the Middle East. I mean, the Houthis, to their credit, have done a spectacular job getting a name for themselves, shutting down commercial traffic, and I think it’s just been a profound challenge, obviously, for folks across the region and more broadly. So I do find this topic a little bit flummoxing. I appreciate that we’re getting to learn vis-à-vis the Houthis, a relatively ragtag violent non-state actor. And whatever we can learn in that regard can hopefully be applicable as we think about state competitors, say China, who might have a different view on what maritime security and the free flow of commerce looks like.

And we’ve seen a panoply of efforts to try to respond to them, whether it’s just in a defensive way in terms of blocking their attacks or in a more offensive way trying to go against their infrastructure across Yemen. But fundamentally, they seem to still have the capabilities to keep on going. And I do wonder, given that this has given them a raison d’être, I wonder if, fingers crossed, we can get a Gaza ceasefire sooner rather than later, I wonder if that actually compels the Houthis to take a break or to just keep on going.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

And what is striking as we have this conversation is a point that you made in a piece that you and Tamara Cofman Wittes wrote in Foreign Affairs in, I think 2018. That was called, “America’s Middle East Purgatory,” and it was about the need to focus less on the region, a region that had consumed so much U.S. attention and resources over the previous decades, and really turn our attention to bigger threats.

It seems like we’re in some ways back to really intensive involvement in the Middle East in ways that, as you note in the more recent piece, have in fact diverted time, attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific, especially. As you reflect back on that strategic dilemma, do you think we’re back to where we were not long ago with the inordinate focus on the Middle East, even as the bigger long-term threats are elsewhere?

MARA KARLIN

We are definitely spending a lot of time focused on the Middle East right now. It also makes a lot of sense, right? We are still in a profoundly precarious time, and what happens in the Middle East, if there’s a spectacular conflict, fundamentally will affect U.S. national security interests. That said, it still shouldn’t be the top priority, and when I look back, say, five years ago or ten years ago when I think we were really quite bogged down in the region, this doesn’t rhyme. This is actually a bit different.

There is an impact to the U.S. security presence in the region right now in terms of trying to contain the conflict, in terms of very active diplomacy as well. Where I think we had gotten into not terrific circumstances over the years has been prioritizing the Middle East just to prioritize the Middle East, or having a fat posture just sitting there but really purposeless and thus becoming like sunk cost to our adversaries.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

The diversion of resources from the Indo-Pacific and deterring China, especially in the Taiwan Strait, has been one of the central arguments that people in the Trump orbit have made about winding down support for Ukraine, and it cuts in the Middle East conversation in a slightly different way. But to what extent do you worry about our readiness in the Indo-Pacific just given the sheer amount of resources we’re sending to Ukraine and now Israel?

MARA KARLIN

Look, this has been the most transformative period of time for U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific. There’s just example after example about how U.S. military posture is becoming more resilient and dispersed across that region. That is fantastic. Our allies and partners across that region are investing in their militaries and are doing more not just with us, but in their own geometries. That is all fantastic. But fundamentally, there are finite resources to the U.S. military. And while it makes sense to me that in this period of time we have had to put more energy toward the Middle East, I do sure hope that we’re not here a year from now still with this really robust effort.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

As the United States has closely watched the war in Ukraine, so has China and so have decision makers in Beijing. What, to your mind, is China learning from the battlefield in Ukraine over the last couple of years? And when you apply your analysis of that war to thinking about a potential Taiwan contingency, what do you think the real lessons are?

MARA KARLIN

I think the Chinese have learned a couple things. One, modernizing and diversifying their nuclear arsenal—a really smart move, definitely makes sense for them. Two, be a bit cautious of this alliance and partnership network that the United States has, because if it’s convened in a thoughtful way, it can have an outsized impact. Three, really got to figure out how to disentangle from the international economy in key areas because that’s obviously had an impact on Russia. The analogy is not perfect on that front, of course, but I do think that they’ve got to be studying that a little bit.

One thing that has struck me so much looking at this conflict, in addition to everything the Chinese are probably taking, has just been the reminder that wars go through phases. And so you’ve got to really figure out what phase are we in, what phase are we moving towards, and how do we maximize our position in that phase? It’s a little too easy to get comfortable, but that’s a little bit dangerous as well.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

As you look at our ability to deter China in the Indo-Pacific at this point, where do you think we still need to do more? You’ve noted that we may have made a lot of progress in building new kinds of configurations and new kinds of military partnerships and getting our allies to do more. Where do you think we still need to make more progress to put ourselves in a position that you would be relatively assured about?

MARA KARLIN

Yeah, so I don’t know that one ever feels assured. I think our field is one where you’ve got to be nervous all the time. But I do think deterrence vis-à-vis China as it relates to Taiwan is in a pretty decent place at this moment in time.

I think when we talk about the “we,” I would take a wide aperture to that definition. So for example, we need to make sure Taiwan continues making the good progress it is on defense reform, for instance. Think about these areas where short of a massive invasion of Taiwan, China tries to change the status quo; vis-à-vis the Philippines has been a really good case study, and kudos to the Philippines military for its efforts to push back the air and maritime arenas around Taiwan we’ve seen China poking at. Now they’re just poking, to be clear, but I worry that they’re trying to do what they can to try to degrade confidence in both Taiwan and other countries.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So a key part of your formula for deterrence, in Asia especially, has to do with this network of U.S. and regional coalitions. So many of those have developed in pretty striking ways in recent years, whether you’re talking about AUKUS or the Quad or military exercises with Japan in the Philippines and Australia, U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation, you could go on and on. When you look at Trump’s return to office next year, this seems like a particularly worrying dimension of it, I think you could say. The way he’s talked about alliances, the way he’s, in some cases, threatened to pull troops out of Korea and Japan or demanded higher payments and other things, seems to really erode the confidence that those allies and partners are going to have in the U.S. presence there. Do you worry about that really changing the balance of deterrence in Asia, and what are the risks there?

MARA KARLIN

I do worry if countries feel like they can’t rely on the United States, they’re invariably going to look for other ways to satisfy their fundamental national security interests. Whether it’s countries who maybe don’t have confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella, deciding that maybe they need their own nuclear weapons, or if it’s countries who decide to work together and just exclude the United States in figuring out how to deal with different challenges.

Look, fundamentally, it seems that the global security environment does better both for the United States and for much of the world when the United States is integral to and highly involved with decision making, and I don’t know that that’s going to be the case throughout these next few years.

I’ll give you one example that sings loudly in my brain. The perennial fight over defense investment across NATO. So President Trump obviously took a vinegar rather than honey approach with allies, and by the time he left office, there were only a handful, less than really 30 percent or so who were investing two percent of their GDP in defense. President Biden, I think, took a different approach, much more honey than vinegar, and now you’ve got nearly 75 percent of NATO allies who are investing in their militaries. To be sure, of course, there is a major variable, which is Russia decided to invade Ukraine during this period of time. I don’t dismiss that. But it does seem to me that working with and collaborating with allies and partners and figuring out how together we tackle challenges usually works out a bit better.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

So I want to close by getting at some of the technological elements here. You note that one of the striking things about Ukraine especially, but you can see this across these different theaters, is just how rapid adaptation has been, how many new uses of drone technology, other kinds of technology you’ve seen from forces on the ground. You refer to a scholarly concept, the constant tactical factor, which is that every improvement in weapons has eventually been met by a counter improvement, and this seems to be happening faster than ever, and you can see this in lots of ways in these battlefields. It’s a trope about the U.S. military and the U.S. Defense Department that it’s incredibly bad at managing this kind of change and integrating new technology. But are there changes that you would make that would allow, whether it’s forces on the ground or other decision makers, to push that adaptation and technological change faster than we’re able to at this point?

MARA KARLIN

In looking at how quickly our system can learn, sometimes there’s a bit of a lag between the folks on the ground learning, the folks in headquarters taking in that information, and then, obviously we have a system of checks and balances, finding a way for the money to be dispersed from Congress to actually go toward those key areas. And so if there’s a way to fast-forward that, maybe through special funds, for example, that can be used particularly for innovation, I think that may be a way to help make sure that we are not just learning the lessons but we’re thus able to apply them as well.

DAN KURTZ-PHELAN

Well, Mara, we will leave it there. Thank you so much for the fascinating piece and conversation. We will pick up a lot of these topics, I hope, in future pieces and conversations with you, but for now, thank you so much for joining me.

MARA KARLIN

Thank you so much for having me.