Can Israel Save Itself?

EVE FAIRBANKS

Ami, it’s great to be with you.

AMI AYALON

Thank you.

EVE FAIRBANKS

You wrote for us recently a very broad piece, a powerful piece, called “Israel Is Fighting a War It Cannot Win: Only a Path to a Palestinian State Can Stop Calamity in Gaza—and the World Must Lead the Way.” But I want to start with “Israel is fighting a war it cannot win.” You wrote, “Today, [this war] is becoming unjust, immoral, and counterproductive, shifting responsibility for the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza from Hamas to Israel.” Can you tell us a little bit more about how you view the different phases of this war? It has now gone on for almost two years.

AMI AYALON

Well, I’ll try to explain the definition of “a war that we cannot win,” because it’s very difficult for Israelis to hear it or to read it. And this is not exactly what I mean—I think that we can win, but not the way we are fighting this war now. And we have to understand something that, by the way, I think in many places, probably even in America, most people do not understand, and especially politicians or statesmen, do not understand the difference between the types of war and the war that we are fighting today during the twenty-first century. The wars today are not between states, and 95 percent of the wars since the collapse of the Soviet Union [are] between a state and an organization. And when the war is between a state and an organization, it’s become, in a way, an irrational kind of war, because there is no military decision on the battlefield.

And Israel-Palestine is a perfect example because we are fighting not against the state of Palestine; there is no Palestinian state. And we are not fighting against the Palestinian people, because, you know, the idea—we cannot win a people. We are not going, you know, to murder, to kill, millions of people. A terror organization will never, by the way, will never raise a white flag. A terror organization will never surrender. And this is something that we cannot understand and we cannot accept. And this is why we are still thinking in terms of a military decision, where military people understand, but politicians cannot live with it. So they do not define a political goal, because, you know, in many, many cases—in our case—Israelis do not agree on the future of Israel: whether it will be Israel from the Jordan to the Sea, as our government is trying to achieve now, or it will be a reality of two states, in which we will enable to preserve our identity as a Jewish democracy and our security.

So when I say that we cannot [win] this war, it is because we do not understand the type of war that we are fighting today. We have a very, very powerful—probably the most powerful—military organization in the Middle East. And we achieved historical—you know, probably the most brilliant military decision, military victory, in human history. I cannot compare. But it is not enough, because Hamas will not raise a white flag, and it is the opposite. We are using a strategy of military decision, which means we are going to kill as many people and to destroy infrastructure until you will understand that you will have to surrender. But they will not surrender, because their strategy is non-surrender. In a way, they win every day and we lose every day, and they have time. The specific case of Hamas is something that—again, Hamas is using its people as a human shield.

EVE FAIRBANKS

Well, that leads me into—there’s so much that you said in there that I want to follow up on, little bits I want to move into. You last spoke to us in November 2023, which you said feels like centuries ago, and yet you probably didn’t anticipate being in this exact place that we’re in right now. And we discussed whether you thought Israel could do more to minimize civilian casualties, and you noted that this is a fair concern, but that this was—not a military operation —it’s a war. And you said you did not think the IDF could achieve its military goals without doing what they were doing because Hamas uses civilians as a human shield. How do you think about that question now?

AMI AYALON

I think that we didn’t learn anything. We Israelis, we didn’t learn anything. Because I think that our military commanders understand it, but they do not control—it is a huge military organization, and you cannot control every soldier, especially in this atmosphere, in which you are fighting in the middle of cities, which is the most dense area ever fought. Many of the terrorists are not in uniform, so every human being is perceived by our soldiers as an enemy. So they kill everybody, because they really believe that they are threatened. And we should not be blamed, but we are responsible. We are responsible [for the] humanitarian crisis that is created under our responsibility, because we have the power to end it because we achieved all the military goals that were declared by our government: to dismantle Hamas as a military organization.

The military goals were to dismantle the military capability of [the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades], which is the military branch of Hamas, and to eliminate, to transfer, or to kill all its political leadership. And we did it. We killed all the leaders, we killed all the military commanders, we destroyed all the military installations, and we killed thousands of the terrorists that, in a way, is Izz al-Din al-Qassam. But since we do not have a political goal, we cannot agree on the day after. Because you know, the majority of Israelis [are] totally against the concept of one state from the Jordan to the Sea, because it is clear to all of us that it will not be a Jewish state and it will not be a democracy. We are not the majority between the Jordan and the Sea. So, the day after should describe a reality in which we preserve our security and our identity. But the government, which is led by the most extreme wing of Jewish radicalism and Jewish racism or superiority—well, they’re leading us against the will of most Israeli citizens.

EVE FAIRBANKS

I hear you saying something interesting, which is that there’s a lot of discussion among observers of Israel, discussion in our magazine, about, what is the vision that the Israeli government has? And to some degree, it seems like you’re saying the point is to have no vision because if the government—if the society confronted the discussion of what the vision is, what it should look like, there would be so much conflict that it would—you know, people fear this discussion, so in a way, you put it off forever.

AMI AYALON

When you think about the wars of Israel, many people will tell you, “Okay, Israel is fighting many wars,” which is nonsense, which is not true. We are fighting one war during the last 140 years, since the beginning of the concept of Zionism. It took 50 years—exactly 50 years—until the UN in 1947 accepted the concept of a Jewish state alongside an Arab state. So we are fighting one war with many, many operations and military campaigns and battles, et cetera, but it is one war in order to create, and then to defend, the state of Israel.

And what I’m saying is that we won this war. And I wrote it in this article several weeks ago. And our victory was achieved in Beirut, March 2002, when all the Arab League members gathered in Beirut and changed the “three no’s” of Khartoum, no to [inaudible]. Now it took many years and in 2002 they understand that we are here to stay, and the world is different, et cetera, et cetera, and it is after, you know, the first Iraq war, and they understand it. And they change to the “three yes’s”: yes to recognition, yes to negotiations, and yes to peace with Israel on the conditions of the international resolutions and the Security Council resolution, two states. And we refuse to recognize our victory. Why? Because we stopped [believing] in diplomacy, because we believe that all the world is against us. It is something very, very deep in the Jewish history. And the Israeli society is a fearful society. And when you confront a person or a group of people, that they are afraid, they are using only one language: violence and military language. They do not believe in creating confidence, because confidence, you know, is a kind of trust. You have to trust whether it is because he has an interest not to fight against us, or because, I don’t know, he identifies, “Well, okay, they will not join the Zionist movement, but they share an interest.”

And today, by the way, the [October 7 attack] brought back the concept of two states to the public debate. We Israelis, and probably most Palestinians, and for sure the international community, forgot it. The Abraham Accords that was a great diplomatic achievement, was the origin, the source, of the violence that we faced on October 7. Because the concept was, the idea was that we cannot solve the conflict, so we have to manage the conflict. In order to manage the conflict, we have to bypass the Palestinians as a people and we have to negotiate with the Arab states. And we negotiated with the [United Arab Emirates], and, you know, the Abraham Accords was based on “Palestinians do not exist.”

And it was a huge mistake, because this was the reason why Hamas came to believe, after the great vision of the American president, of [Joe Biden], that was published in Delhi—a new Middle East from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, but no Palestinians. Palestinians were not there. So Hamas understood that if this vision will be created, Palestinians as a people will disappear from history—and not to wait, and to launch an attack on October 7.

EVE FAIRBANKS

It’s an interesting idea that you’re advancing, which is that certain things that the world and Israelis view as among the things that they can be proud of completely, great victories—the Abraham Accords, certain military victories more recently, or pyrrhic victories—should be understood in the reverse, were misunderstood, and that, in fact, there was a victory in the early 2000s that Israel didn’t notice, wasn’t prepared to notice, didn’t acknowledge. What would you say to people who say, “Ami, you have this vast military experience as commander of the navy, security experience. How can you say that Israel achieved its real victory in 2002 when certain things that would’ve been a fantasy for a long time, which is the crippling of Iran, the dismantling, to some degree, of Hezbollah, these great military victories that Israel has apparently accomplished in the last year, two years—you know, we’re in a better position militarily and in the region and we’re stronger and we’re more dominant than we’ve ever been?” What would you say to that?

AMI AYALON

First of all you cannot separate Iran from the Palestinian conflict because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not the major conflict in the Middle East. You know, Iran is a physical, existential threat. And if they will achieve a nuclear military power, well, it is a different Middle East. But we do not understand that Iran is not a threat only against Israel. When the [2015] nuclear deal was on the table, it was the main issue in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, in Jordan, in Syria, everywhere. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a common denominator of all the Arab states and the world of Islam.

You know, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brings together nationality and religion. Today, you cannot separate my identity as an Israeli citizen or a Jewish nationality from statehood. So religion, nationality—it is becoming very, very dangerous when this is a reason to go to war. Because a religious war is totally different from a type of a pragmatic war, which is a war between states. Whoever will raise the flag of “I am fighting for Palestine” will lead the Arab world, and this was what Iran did. Iran, by the way, when all the Arab states forgot Palestine because they tried to achieve, you know, economic relations, military relations, intelligence relations with Israel—probably many of them, by the way, were ready because they thought that Israel is a gate to America—but this was pragmatism. After 2011, the Arab Spring, we understand that we are facing a different Middle East in which the street achieved a major part of the political power.

We saw what happened to leaders who did not understand it. And I quote [Saudi Crown Prince] Mohammed bin Salman, who said to [U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken], he said, “Do you think that I care about Palestine? No, I don’t, but my people do.” But he understands that unless he will understand the will of the street, he will find himself in the place of [former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak], when more than one million people went out to Tahrir Square, the Arab street, the Muslim street. We see it, by the way, in the Middle East. By the way, we see it in Europe, and we see it in American universities. So it is not a minor conflict between Israelis and Palestinians anymore. It’s a major regional conflict which creates a major impact on the international community, on the economy, and on the political stability in Europe, in America, in many, many other places. So this is a time, in a way—this is an opportunity.

EVE FAIRBANKS

Your piece has these three components. Essentially, the longer these military operations with no political vision, no day-after vision, no end game, go on, the more responsibility comes onto Israel for the injustice and the grave moral problems of this war, the calamities in Gaza—

AMI AYALON

Yeah, and the humanitarian crisis which is created under our responsibility.

EVE FAIRBANKS

Yes. Then the second component is your acknowledgement that regional states will not play into Israel’s, let’s say, maybe, fantasy of how a diplomatic, hyper-pragmatic solution would be achieved without some facing and reckoning with the issue of the Palestinians.

And then the third component is a path forward. So you lay out two paths that Israel has, which is to continue on its status quo military operations—graver and graver humanitarian catastrophe, as you say—and the other path is some path toward a two-state solution. You say that this should begin, or that it really needs to start, with a powerful statement and a sense of unity between certain outside players. Who are those, and can you say why psychologically it’s important that there be a joint sense, externally, of a kind of world solution for this?

AMI AYALON

Now the tragedy of Israel, and probably—I have no idea about America—but many other places, is that we see the enemy—they, they see the enemy—in the eyes of military generals. They do not understand statesmanship. And the tragedy of Israel is that none—none—of our political leaders do not reach the level of statesmanship. We do not have any statesmen among our political leaders.

EVE FAIRBANKS

Why do you think that is?

AMI AYALON

The revolution in media affairs, or you know, communication, and of [inaudible]. Now, a political leader has to be elected. And when the people in the street are afraid, we always prefer security [over] rights, especially, so this is the first step in the long road that leads to the collapse of all the democracies. You know, the major power, the political power, is not in the hand of the elected leaders or non-elected leaders; it’s in the street. So a popular leader, he understands—you know, in a real pragmatic world, when you face a society which is afraid, you will do everything in order to reduce the level of fear. But in this case you take advantage of the fear in order to be elected.

EVE FAIRBANKS

You have this society that’s very fearful, but what is the role that the so-called international community can play here? Because you describe in your piece that it should and it can play a strong role. I think, though, that the general feeling is, among a lot of people who consider themselves sophisticated political analysts, that if the international community, if the United Kingdom, if Europe, puts a lot of pressure on Israel, it will only make Israelis defensive, and they’ll say no, and they’ll resist this always. Can you just lay out in a basic way for us what your piece envisions of the role that the international community can play, and why maybe that’s different from how it is acting currently?

AMI AYALON

I expect the international community to lead. I think that here the answer is very, very simple. This is exactly what the Saudi and the French initiative is trying to do. In a way, they are saying, “Look, we understand that the only viable future is two states. There is no other concept which looks like a viable concept in order to maintain our identity and our security on both sides, Palestinians and us.” And it did not work. So we should not change the goal; we should change the structure, the architecture, of the process. And let’s start by deciding that it will be negotiated between two states, not between a state and an organization. And in your article, I wrote—look, Palestinians recognized Israel three times: in 1988 when they came with the declaration of the Palestinian independence, when they signed [the Oslo Accords] 1993, and then in the Arab Peace Initiative. They recognized Israel as a state, but we never recognized Palestine.

EVE FAIRBANKS

So in your view it is important, recognition, in order to have a proper interlocutor—

AMI AYALON

It is a precondition. Because this is the only way to defeat Hamas. You know, Hamas is not the military wing of Hamas, Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Hamas is a combination between a military capability, but ideology, and the ideology is a major threat. Because even if we shall kill all its terror activists, they have children. A child who lost his parents, what do you think he will do? He will become a terrorist. So, in order to defeat an ideology, we have to present a better ideology and to promise it: a political horizon of a Palestinian state. And if we shall do it, and we shall show him, on the ground, that we are marching, every day, we are doing one step, it will take many years.

EVE FAIRBANKS

In the November interview that you did with us, you said that, in your view, you doubted that Israelis would back a government doing what the current government has been doing for very long. And it made me wonder what you’ve learned about Israeli society over the last two years.

AMI AYALON

“Confusion” is the way to describe the Israeli society. When you read the polls, there are so many contradictions. On one hand, 70 percent of the Israelis believe that in order to bring back the hostages and to end the war, we are ready to pay the process that will lead to a Palestinian state. On the other side, most Israelis believe that all Palestinians are Hamas and there are no innocent people in Gaza. I don’t know—there is no way to define the Israelis but to say we are in a state of fear and confusion. In a state of fear, you need an anchor of hope.

For me, the best example is what happened to us when [former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat] came to Jerusalem. It was after the bloodiest war ever fought in Israel. We hated the Egyptians, but he came to Israel and he spoke to us. He did it against the whole Arab and Muslim world. He was brave enough—by the way, he was assassinated on this issue, exactly as [former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin], two pioneers of peace were assassinated because their societies, the Israel society and the Egyptian society, did not understand it. But I saw what happened in one day, on the day later. No, he became something that most Israelis said that, “We trust him.” In recent polls, you know who the Israeli trusts, most Israelis? Trump and bin Salman. We do not trust [any] of our leaders. We trust only Trump and bin Salman. I’m not sure about today because Trump is changing his views every day. But we believe that he brought back the hostages, not our prime minister. It is clear that our [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] was against it. By the way, 50 percent of the people who voted for Netanyahu believe that he should resign immediately when the war will be over.

EVE FAIRBANKS

Do you think that the Biden administration wasted any opportunities? Because it also had a high level of trust, at a certain point, among Israelis. There was a real fondness for Biden. And was there an opportunity in that, that maybe this president, maybe a future American president, maybe another world leader could see? Was there a missed opportunity in that trust?

AMI AYALON

I don’t know almost anything about the American political community of politics. It was the time of elections and he has to be elected. And I know what happens to any leader who wants to be elected. He’s losing his political courage. I cannot blame him, because I know that, you know, the cemeteries of political figures are full with people a lot less capable, probably more educated, but they decided to go on with what they believe in and they lost elections.

I think that Israelis do not understand how important [Biden was] to save Israel. I’m not exaggerating: to save Israel. You know that we know today, we have the intelligence information, that unless America, Biden, would send the navy, including submarines, to the east of the Mediterranean, I believe that Iran will join Lebanon and Hezbollah, and our military victory today—I don’t think that we could be able to—this the idea that we can fight Gaza and only later, you know, it’s in sequence, not to fight everybody, Hezbollah, Iran, Hamas, and the Houthis [at] the same time—was everything. And it was achieved by the immediate decision of Biden to do everything to sacrifice the position of America in the Middle East.

EVE FAIRBANKS

We read a lot of opinion polls about Israelis: “Israelis believe this about the people in Gaza,” “Israelis have a very declined faith in the two-state solution.” Yet I also find that when I talk to a range of Israeli writers, they’ll often say, “You know, I agree with the types of things that Ami is saying. I agree that this is a humanitarian catastrophe. I agree, even, you know, we could contemplate the word genocide, talk about that. I agree that there has to be a two-state solution, but I won’t write it.”

AMI AYALON

Why?

EVE FAIRBANKS

Well, that’s my question. But I’m wondering, what do you think, in your experience, or maybe just your character, has allowed you to stand outside the Israeli consensus and see Israelis?

AMI AYALON

You’re asking me to define myself. When I try to do it, I—I published a book, in a way, that tells the history of the state of Israel and my story, et cetera, and when I wrote the book, I learned a lot about myself. I saw that probably almost from the day that I was born, I’m a minority. I do not represent the Israeli society or the Israeli military community. I represent my views. I think that in many cases, most people agree, but they are not there to say it. And you know, I have nothing to lose. I am 80 years old. It took 50 years from the First Zionist Congress until the UN resolution, two states. I know that it will not be in my lifetime. But my parents gave me a childhood with hope, and this is what I hope to [give to] my grandchildren.

EVE FAIRBANKS

I think that’s a great point to end, and I want to direct people to your piece because it really contains an idea in it that this could really be a positive future for Israel, for the region, the type of two-state solution that you lay out, as opposed to the least bad, the only, least bad, a very negative framing, so it’s a really powerful framing.

AMI AYALON

We have the duty to dream.

EVE FAIRBANKS

It’s powerful to hear from you and your experience. Thank you, thank you for your great piece. Great to talk to you.

AMI AYALON

Thank you.